Games in rigged economies by Seoane, Luís F
Games in rigged economies
Lu´ıs F Seoane1, 2
1Departamento de Biolog´ıa de Sistemas, Centro Nacional de Biotecnolog´ıa (CSIC), C/ Darwin 3, 28049 Madrid, Spain.
2Instituto de F´ısica Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos IFISC (CSIC-UIB), Palma de Mallorca, Spain.
Modern economies evolved from simpler human exchanges into very convoluted systems. Today,
a multitude of aspects can be regulated, tampered with, or left to chance; these are economic
degrees of freedom which together shape the flow of wealth. Economic actors can exploit them,
at a cost, and bend that flow in their favor. If intervention becomes widespread, microeconomic
strategies of different actors can collide or resonate, building into macroeconomic effects. How
viable is a ‘rigged’ economy, and how is this viability affected by growing economic complexity
and wealth? Here we capture essential elements of ‘rigged’ economies with a toy model. Nash
equilibria of payoff matrices in simple cases show how increased intervention turns economic de-
grees of freedom from minority into majority games through a dynamical phase. These stages are
reproduced by agent-based simulations of our model, which allow us to explore scenarios out of
reach for payoff matrices. Increasing economic complexity is then revealed as a mechanism that
spontaneously defuses cartels or consensus situations. But excessive complexity enters abruptly
into a regime of large fluctuations that threaten the system’s viability. This regime results from
non-competitive efforts to intervene the economy coupled across degrees of freedom, becoming
unpredictable. Thus non-competitive actions can result in negative spillover due to sheer eco-
nomic complexity. Simulations suggest that wealth must grow faster than linearly with economic
complexity to avoid this regime and keep economies viable in the long run. Our work provides
testable conclusions and phenomenological charts to guide policing of ‘rigged’ economic systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of ‘rigged’ economic scenarios is am-
ply acknowledged. Most notable examples are non-
competitive markets [1, 2], legal or illegal, such as cartels,
or natural monopolies [3]. In these, all actors usually
cooperate to secure similar profits. This entails ‘hand-
crafting’ some aspects of the economic games in which
they engage. In competitive markets we also find illegal
schemes (e.g. inside trading) or innovative, often border-
line legal, enterprises to explore unprecedented economic
possibilities – e.g. anticipating a broker’s moves with
faster internet cables [4]. Such out-of-the-box thinking
is part of the economy’s open-ended nature [5, 6]. It
redesigns the rules of the game and easily results in a
sentiment that “the market is rigged” [4]. Even if all ac-
tors stick to the norms and do not innovate, competitive
markets are strongly regulated. Some conditions (e.g. de-
manding a minimum equity to participate) are designed
by governments or international institutions. They might
change due to democratic consensus or lobbying. If pow-
erful firms bend the rules systematically, regulatory cap-
ture happens [7–9] threating democracy at large [10, 11].
As transnational markets grow ever more complex and
faster, slow public bureaucracies might lag behind and
abdicate into nimbler private regulators [12, 13].
Through and through, economies are ‘rigged’. Avail-
able games are somehow manufactured. Once estab-
lished, they remain open to manipulations that might i)
impact costs and rewards of economic games, ii) cap the
information available, or iii) limit the number of players
allowed to partake. This can be achieved through public-
ity, bribes, threats, imposing tariffs, etc. More abstractly,
we can think of degrees of freedom that can be harnessed
in economic systems. Each degree of freedom is a pocket
of opportunity that can be exploited, contested or uncon-
tested, at some cost. Envelop theorems assess changes of
likely payoffs when a game is altered externally [14–16].
Wolpert and Grana [17] recently wondered how much an
agent should pay if she (and no other actor involved) was
given this control before playing a game. The decision
boils down to a positive payoff balance with versus with-
out intervention. Thus a single agent is offered control,
at a cost, over a single economic degree of freedom.
Here we study what happens when multiple actors are
allowed, also at a cost, to manipulate several economic
degrees of freedom. Different efforts might align or not,
yielding uncertain returns. A single agent’s decision to
rig one game (as per [17]) might be of limited conse-
quence in isolation. But effects may be amplified, mit-
igated, or produce emergent phenomena when coupled
across games and players. We are interested in how mi-
croscopic fates scale up to macroeconomic trends, so we
adopt a systemic perspective. More available degrees of
freedom result in more complex economies – interven-
tion possibilities grow combinatorially and more exter-
nal variables become relevant if extra degrees of freedom
are left unchecked. How do system-wide dynamics of a
rigged economy depend on its complexity? How much
can such economies grow? Open-endedly, perhaps? Do
they collapse, unable to sustain their participants? How
is this affected by the amount of wealth generated and
distributed? What is a natural level of intervention de-
pending on these aspects?
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FIG. 1 A rigged economy and its dynamics. a Three
agents choose (red shade) whether to rig each game (black
boxes) or not (empty boxes), and (gray shade) what to play
in each game (aik = 1 or 0). b-d Dynamics of model mea-
surements for CC = 10, n = 20, and B = 100 (thus b = 5). b
Population (black, left scale) and wealth (red, right scale).
We could tackle these questions rigorously through
utility functions that discount intervention costs, as in
[17], extended to multiple agents and games; but this
quickly becomes untreatable. Instead, inspired by agent-
based models and complex adaptive systems [18–23], we
capture essential elements that affect our research ques-
tions into a toy economy. We assume a population of
agents who engage in n economic games. Each game has
a rule that randomly determines its winning strategy.
Agents can pay to intervene each game’s rule, affecting
the winning strategy for all (figure 1a). These games
constitute our degrees of freedom, thus n is a proxy for
the economy’s complexity. An amount of wealth, B, is
distributed among winners. B reminds us of a GDP and
is a proxy for our economy’s size. The model is described
in detail in section II. We miss some important ways of
manipulating real economies – such shortages and model
extensions are discussed in section IV.
We write complete payoff matrices for some simple sce-
narios. Their analysis (section III.A) shows that increas-
ing intervention switches isolated degrees of freedom from
minority to coordination games. In between, Nash equi-
libria are mixed strategies, anticipating dynamic strug-
gles. We explore increasing economy size and complexity
with simulations based on agents of bounded rational-
ity and Darwinian dynamics to select successful strate-
gies. We argue (section IV) that our results should not
depend critically on the agent’s rationality and the Dar-
winism. We simulate model dynamics for a small, fixed
number of degrees of freedom as economy size grows (sec-
tion III.B). This reveals the same progression: from mi-
nority, through dynamic, to coordinating regimes. The
later remind us of cartels. Adding degrees of freedom
abruptly halts within-game coordination, suggesting an
empirical test: increased economic complexity should dis-
solve cartels spontaneously. We study our toy economy’s
viability as its complexity grows large and its size scales
appropriately (section III.C). Economies whose size does
not grow fast enough with their complexity fall in a
large-fluctuations regime that threatens their viability –
thus non-competitive actions can have negative spillovers
as agents and degrees of freedom become coupled en
masse. Our toy model allows us to find limit regimes
(e.g. within-game coordination, large-fluctuations, etc.)
that emerge from essential elements potentially common
to any ‘rigged’ economy. We lay out comprehensive maps
of such regimes (section III.D). Their occurrence is tied
to a few, yet abstract parameters. In section IV we spec-
ulate how we might link them to real-world economies.
II. METHODS
A. Model description
Our toy economy (Figure 1a) consists of a fixed num-
ber of games, n; and a population of N(t) ∈ [0, Nmax]
agents that changes over time. At each iteration, every
agent has to play all games, which admit strategies 0 or
1. The strategies played by agent Ai are collected in an
array: ai ≡ [aik, k = 1, . . . , n]. Besides, a second array
ri ≡ [rik, k = 1, . . . , n] codifies whether Ai attempts to
rig game k (rik = 1) or not (r
i
k = 0). The combination
(aik, r
i
k) constitutes the proper strategy of agent A
i to-
wards game k. However, to aid the model’s discussion,
we use the word ‘strategy’ only to name aik.
At each iteration a rule exists, common to all agents,
that determines the winning strategy for each game:
R(t) ≡ [Rk(t) ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, . . . , n]. If any agents at-
3tempt to rig game k, Rk(t) takes the most common action
among those rigging agents (Figure 1a4):
Rk(t) = argmax
a¯∈{0,1}
(||{Ai, aik = a¯, rik = 1} ||) . (1)
In case of draw (including no intervention), Rk(t) is set
randomly (Figure 1a2-3). Each agent pays an amount
CR for each intervention attempt – successful or not. If
Ai has a wealth wi(t) at the beginning of a round, after
setting R(t) this becomes:
wi(t+ ∆trig) = w
i(t)− CR
∑
k
rik. (2)
Each round, an amount b is ruffled at each game –
a total wealth B = nb is potentially distributed. The
amount allocated to game k is split between all agents
who played the winning strategy, Rk(t). After this:
wi(t+ ∆tplay) = w
i(t+ ∆trig)
+ b
∑
k
δ(aik, Rk(t))
Nwk (t)
, (3)
where δ(·, ·) is Kronecker’s delta and Nwk (t) is the number
of winners of game k. If wi(t+∆tplay) < 0, the i-th agent
is removed, decreasing the population by 1.
If wi(t+ ∆tplay) > CC , A
i has a child and an amount
CC is subtracted from w
i. A new agent is generated
which inherits ai and ri. Each of the bits in these arrays
flips once with a probability pµ. After this, both arrays
remain fixed throughout the new agent’s lifetime. We
generate an integer number j ∈ [1, Nmax] to allocate the
new individual. If j ≤ N(t), the new agent becomes Aj .
The former agent in that position is removed, its wealth
is lost, and the population size remains unchanged. If
j > N(t), the new individual is appended at the end of
the pool and the population grows by 1.
B. Measurements on model dynamics
For each simulation we set model parameters (CR = 1,
CC = 10, pµ = 0.1, and N
max = 1000; but variations
are explored in Appendix C to show the generality of our
results). We explore ranges of n and B to address the
main questions – i.e. “how do rigged economies behave
as their complexity and size change?”
Model simulations start with a single agent A1 with
random strategies and no interventions (r1k = 0,∀k). In
average, A1 accrues half of the distributed wealth until
w1(t) > CC . As new descents fill the population, rein-
forcing or competing strategies unfold. After a rapid ini-
tial growth, population size and wealth reach an attractor
(Figure 1b). We asses these attractors numerically. Sim-
ulations run for 5000 iterations. We take averages (noted
〈·〉) of diverse quantities over the last 500 iterations. For
example, population size 〈N〉, for which we also report
normalized fluctuations σ(N)/ 〈N〉, where σ(·) indicates
standard deviation. Unless B is very small, 5000 itera-
tions suffice to observe convergence (Supporting Figures
13, 14, and 15).
To measure the heterogeneity of strategies in the pop-
ulation, we take the fraction fk(t) of agents with ak = 1:
fk(t) =
N(t)∑
i=1
δ(aik, 1)
N(t)
, (4)
from which we compute the entropy:
hak(t) = −
[
fk(t)log2(fk(t))
+(1− fk(t))log2(1− fk(t))
]
(5)
and mean entropy across games (Figure 1c):
ha(t) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
hak(t). (6)
If hak(t) = 0, all agents play the same strategy in game k.
This quantity is maximal (hak(t) = 1) if the population
splits in half around that game. If ha(t) = 0, agents play
the same strategy in each game, but not necessarily the
same one across games. If ha(t) = 1, agents are split
in half at each game, but this split is not necessarily
consistent across games.
Finally, we introduce the rigging pressure on a game:
rk(t) =
1
N(t)
N(t)∑
i=1
rik, rk(t) ∈ [0, 1]; (7)
as well as the total rigging pressure (Figure 1d):
r(t) =
n∑
k=1
rk(t), r(t) ∈ [0, n]; (8)
and average rigging pressure per game r(t)/n ∈ [0, 1].
III. RESULTS
A. Intervention turns minority into majority games
Before looking at model dynamics we can gain some
insight from payoff matrices in simple cases. Population
size affects these matrices: earnings are split among win-
ners; and more agents imply more distinct, possible cor-
relations between strategies and rigging choices. Hence,
utility functions rapidly become very complex. In ap-
pendix A we discuss payoff matrices for a single game
and one player (Supporting Table I) and for one game
and three players (Supporting Tables II, III, and IV). All
matrices show average earnings over time if strategies,
rigging choices, and population size are fixed.
Table I presents the payoff matrix for one game with
two players. If CR > b/2, rigging the game is prohibitive.
4Agent 1
Agent 2
TABLE I Payoff matrix of one game with two players. Table entries are labeled by each agent’s strategy a1 = 0, 1 and
rigging choice r1 = 0, 1. Each cell displays average payoff with no death or reproduction for fixed options. Gray cells are Nash
equilibria if CR > b/2. Gray circuits indicate possible dynamic situations that emerge for CR < b/2.
Then, the system has the Nash equilibria marked in gray
– both agents try to take opposite actions a1 6= a2. With
no intervention, we deal with a minority game. For larger
populations it pays even more to be in the minority (Sup-
porting Table II). These equilibria disappear if interven-
tion is cheap enough (CR < b/2 in table I, but depends
on population size). Then, it becomes more profitable for
one player to rig the game while playing a minority strat-
egy. But it also becomes better, for the other agent, to
parasitize the other’s effort – turning the winning strat-
egy into a majority. If the game were played sequentially,
a dynamic scenario ensues alternating minority and ma-
jority configurations (gray circuits in table I). As more
players are added, the stakes become higher and the situ-
ation more complex. Each player wants to be in the ma-
jority among rigging agents, but in the minority among
non-rigging ones. For n > 3, if all agents are intervening
(red frame, Supporting Table IV), the sub-game’s Nash
equilibrium is a full coordination. This is not a global
equilibrium, but large coordinations emerge in our sim-
ulations for rising intervention levels (see next section).
Note how all agents rigging a game in an agreed-upon
way to share profits resembles a cartel.
Payoff matrices are equal for all games. If n games were
played in isolation (i.e. wealth earned by manipulating
a game could not be invested into another), we would
observe the same transition to within-game coordination
for each degree of freedom as intervention takes hold.
What happens when we lift such compartmentalization?
B. Fixed complexity and growing wealth
We now study model dynamics and stability for a fixed
number of games and varying economy size. Discussion
of the rich behavior uncovered follows in Appendix B.
Figure 2a shows 〈N〉 for n = 2 games. Circles over
the plots indicate values of B for which a stretch of the
dynamics is plotted in Supporting Figure 14. Generally,
〈N〉 increases with the economy size – i.e. as more money
becomes available to sustain more agents or to invest into
rigging more games. Indeed, the rigging pressure per
game (Figure 2b) grows more or less monotonously. 〈N〉
is not so parsimonious. For roughly B < 750 it grows
steadily. At B ∼ 750 it jumps swiftly, then remains
similar but slightly declining up until B ∼ 1600, when
it undergoes another abrupt increase.
These population boosts seem associated to varying
coordination. Figure 2c shows that the strategy entropy
〈ha〉 drops sharply before the first boost (shaded area).
Before that drop, resources are scarce and rigging the
economy is difficult. Either strategy is equally likely to
win, so agents playing either option are equally abundant
(Supporting Figure 14a). As B grows, more resources be-
come available to rig the games. Either 1 or 0 becomes
the winning strategy over longer time stretches, resulting
in temporary selective preferences for one strategy over
the other, and oscillatory dynamics ensue (Supporting
Figure 14b-c). As 〈ha〉 falls definitely, agents coordi-
nate their strategies (Supporting Figure 14d-e). These
dynamics shifts happen simultaneously in all games –
as if, so far, payoff matrices were essentially indepen-
dent for each degree of freedom. By B ∼ 1000 we ex-
hausted all within-game regimes uncovered in payoff ma-
trices: from minority games, through a dynamic struggle,
to a mostly majority game. The final population boost
at B ∼ 1600 must entail emerging correlations across
games – e.g. clustering agents that play the minority vs
majority strategies in both games.
Supporting Figures 4 and 5 compare 〈N〉, 〈r〉 /n, and
〈ha〉 as economy size grows for different, fixed n. With
more games, more discrete jumps in 〈N〉 appear. These
arise, potentially, from the combinatorially growing co-
ordination possibilities across games. They happen after
the oscillatory phases (Supporting Figures 3 and 15c-e
for n = 3). This again suggests that within-game co-
ordination happens first, simultaneously for all games;
then degrees of freedom start coupling with each other.
Some regimes have similar 〈N〉 for different n (horizontal
dashed lines, Supporting Figure 4a), suggesting that they
are effectively similar. Population boosts succeed each
other more rapidly for larger n, approaching a continu-
ous buildup instead of discrete jumps (Supporting Fig-
ure 5a). This is not reflected by 〈ha〉, which only drops
once due to within-game coordination. The 〈ha〉 plateau
is higher for larger n (Supporting Figure 5c), indicating
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FIG. 2 Model behavior for n = 2 games and growing wealth, B. a 〈N〉, b 〈r〉 /n, and c 〈ha〉. Open circles indicate B
values for which we plot sample dynamics in Supporting Figure 14. Red vertical lines loosely indicate discrete jumps in 〈N〉.
that across-game correlations weaken or interrupt within-
game coordination. Above, we compared such coordina-
tion to cartels: games are consensually rigged to favor
most actors. Our results suggest that increasing eco-
nomic complexity prevents the formation of such consen-
sus, defusing cartels, even with rising intervention levels.
This is a testable conclusion of our model.
C. Growing wealth and economic complexity
We now change the number of games as wealth scales
asB = B(B0, n). The constantB0 is a normalizing factor
to facilitate comparisons. We explore four cases:
I: A fixed wealth BI = B0 is split evenly between all
games: bI = B0/n. Returns per game drop as the
economy becomes more complex.
II: Each game distributes a fixed amount bII = B0, to-
tal wealth grows linearly BII = B0 ·n. Returns per
game remain constant against growing complexity.
III: Each degree of freedom revalues previously exist-
ing games logarithmically: bIII = B0 (log(n) + 1).
Total wealth grows as BIII ∼ B0 · n (log(n) + 1).
IV : Each degree of freedom revalues previously existing
games linearly: bIV = B0 · n. Total wealth grows
quadratically: BIV = B0 · n2.
Figure 3a-b shows 〈N〉 for each scenario. Extreme
cases I (black curves) and IV (green) are relatively un-
interesting: Stable population size declines quickly for
I. As the economic complexity grows and returns per
game drop, more intervention is needed to secure the
same earnings. Such rigged economies collapse if they
become too complex. For IV , wealth grows so quickly
with n that, promptly, population saturates.
Intermediate cases II (blue curves) and III (red) are
more interesting. With B0 = 50 (Figure 3a) and B0 =
100 (Figure 3b), 〈N〉 in declines slowly for II. Thus, in
general, a rigged economy’s wealth must grow faster than
linearly with its complexity to remain viable. In case
III, 〈N〉 saturates for B0 = 100; but not for B0 = 50,
for which population seems stagnant.
For case II, and III with B0 = 50, fluctuations
in population size reveal the existence of thresholds,
n∗II/III(B0), at which system dynamics change abruptly
(Figure 3c-d). This affects 〈N〉 marginally (arrows in
Figure 3a-b), but the increase in σ(N)/ 〈N〉 is always
salient. For n < n∗, fluctuations are small (< 5%). For
n > n∗(B0) large fluctuations (∼ 25% for case II and
∼ 15% for case III) set in. There is an absorbing state
at N(t) = 0, thus fluctuations of 15 − 25% system size
can compromise its viability.
We explore the transition to large fluctuations by simu-
lating case II below (n = 40, 60) and above (n = 80, 100)
their onset at n∗. We ran the model for 5000 iterations
and discarded the first 1000. Figure 3e shows the prob-
ability of finding the system with population N . Be-
low n∗ we see a neat Gaußian; above, the distribution
presents two balanced modes. Transitions between them
contribute to the large fluctuations. We also plot to-
tal wealth (Figure 3f) and wealth per agent (Figure 3g).
Their averages fall, first, and grow, eventually, as n in-
creases. Below n∗ clear Gaußians appear again. Above,
we observe broad tails, indicating inequality. Despite
risking collapse, the average agent can be wealthier in
the large-fluctuations regime.
D. Charting rigged economies
We run simulations of case I (BI ≡ B0, bI ≡ B0/n)
for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed
wealth, B0. This renders maps (Figure 4) where the four
scalings above can be read as curved sections. Trivially,
case I traces a horizontal line (solid, red; bottom of each
map). Case II traces a line with slope B0 (dashed black
lines). Cases III (dotted black) and IV (dash-dotted
black) trace curves growing faster than linearly. Read-
ing 〈N〉 (Figure 4a) or σ(N)/ 〈N〉 (Figure 4b-c) along
such curves renders the plots from figures 3a-b and 3c-d.
Results for fixed n and growing B from Figure 2 result
from vertical cuts of the map. Other possible progres-
sions B = B(n) can be charted similarly.
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The large-fluctuations regime is a salient anomaly (Fig-
ure 4b-c) expanding up- and right-wards (perhaps un-
boundedly) over a broad range of (n,B) values. Its con-
tour constraints dependencies, B = B(n), that could
avoid this regime. Its upper bound seems to grow faster
than n · log(n) suggesting that case III with B0 = 50 will
not scape large-fluctuations despite sustained growth.
Supporting Figure 6 shows maps for 〈ha〉 and 〈r〉 /n.
The dent of low 〈ha〉 due to within-game coordination
in simple yet wealthy setups is notable (Supporting Fig-
ure 6a). We argued that such cartel-like cases could be
defused by increasing complexity. But this map shows
that, if n grows too much without raising B, 〈ha〉 drops
gradually – consensus strategies build up again. It is in-
tuitive that 〈r〉 /n grows alongside B (Supporting Figure
6b), since more available resources can be dedicated to
rigging the games. Less intuitively, our map shows 〈r〉 /n
growing with n as well, even if returns per game diminish.
We speculate that, for low n, different agents meddling
are likely to collide, resulting in uncertain returns. With
larger n, different agents can intervene different degrees
of freedom, lowering the chance of mutual frustration.
IV. DISCUSSION
It is difficult to pinpoint what an ‘unrigged’ economy
is. We model economies as containing degrees of freedom
that can be controlled at a cost by its actors. Unchecked
degrees favor economic agents at random. An economy
with more ‘riggable’ facets is more complex. We studied
dynamics, stability, and viability of a rigged economy toy
model as its complexity and total wealth change.
Simple scenarios allow a study of equilibria in payoff
matrices. We find that individual degrees of freedom turn
from minority into majority games, through a dynamical
7phase, as intervention raises. Agent-based simulations
confirm these regimes. They also show new behaviors as
synergies develop between degrees of freedom. These new
behaviors (difficult to capture with payoff matrices) halt
within-game coordination. Within-game coordination in
simple yet wealthy markets resembles cartels: most eco-
nomic actors with decision power bend the rules homoge-
neously in their favor. Our results suggest that this con-
sensus is spontaneously defused if the system becomes
complex enough, which can be empirically tested.
We study our toy economies as their complexity in-
creases and the wealth they distribute remains constant,
grows linearly, or faster than linearly with the number of
economic degrees of freedom. In general, wealth should
grow faster than linearly. Against raising complexity,
stagnant or slowly growing wealth only sustains a de-
creasing ensemble of actors sharing ever more meager re-
sources. An unlucky fluctuation can kill them off. This
becomes more pressing as our model predicts that large
fluctuations build up abruptly above a complexity thresh-
old. These large fluctuations remind us of chaotic regimes
in the El Farol and similar problems [18–21]. In them,
agents with sufficient rationality anticipate a market, but
their own success turns the market unpredictable. In our
model, above a complexity threshold, non-competitive
intervention choices become intertwined across games.
Birth and death of agents ripple system-wide, making
successful strategies hard to track. Even though agents
are exploring non-competitive strategies, large fluctua-
tions (∼ 15− 20% population size) ensue, compromising
the system’s viability – thus non-competitive actions can
result in negative spillover by sheer market complexity.
This is another testable conclusion.
Behavioral economics offers a prominent chance to test
our findings. We see stable states with raising rigging
pressure as expected returns grow. This is consistent
with empirical data on cheating: while different profiles
exist (including people hardly corrupted), cheating even-
tually ensues for large enough rewards [24], especially
after removing the concern of being caught [25]. Further
experiments reveal that cheating is more likely as a part-
nership [26]. This resounds with our model’s “cartels” in
simple yet wealthy economies. Such simple experiments
are perfect to test our predictions for growing complex-
ity: Does coordination fall apart swiftly? Does rigging
pressure grow with complexity in the long run? More
ambitiously, we could emulate recent implementations of
Prisoner dilemmas and other simple games [27–36].
This work did not aim at specific realism, but at
capturing elements that we find essential about ‘rigged’
economies, and thus derive qualitative regimes and
wealth-complexity scalings that keep our toy economies
viable. Exploring lesser model parameters (Appendix C),
the same phenomenology features consistently. This en-
courages us to think that we are unveiling general results
of ‘rigged’ economies. But we made important simplifi-
cations to keep our model tractable. All agents partici-
pate of all games, while real economic actors might walk
out or be banned from a specific market. We model all
degrees of freedom with a similar game. Real manipula-
tions might treat agents with a same strategy differently.
Some pay off only the first intervention, others reward
non-linearly a varying investment. Exploring these and
other alternatives is easy and might uncover new systemic
regimes. Our results constitute solid limit behaviors that
should be recovered under appropriate circumstances.
In our model, wealth is generated externally – the eco-
nomic games merely distribute it. An important varia-
tion should create wealth organically, depending on pop-
ulation size, strategies explored, and degrees of freedom
available. These, like technological niches, are devel-
oped and sustained at a cost. Rigged economies might
then correct themselves by losing complexity if neces-
sary. Similar feedbacks can poise complex systems near
critical regimes [37–44], which proved relevant to ratio-
nalize some phenomenology in economics [21, 23, 45] –
at criticality we observe fat tails in wealth distributions
or dynamic turnover of complex markets.
An important design choice are the Darwinian dynam-
ics that propagate successful strategies. We could have
modeled boundedly rational agents that learn, similarly
spreading successful behaviors. A key parameter then
would be a learning rate, instead of our replication cost,
CC . Similar models show that certain regimes depend
tangentially on the cognitive mechanism [18–21]. Dif-
ferent implementations might move around the onset of
unpredictable regimes (as CC does, Supporting Figure
7). When unpredictability is intrinsic to the phenom-
ena studied, rational agents cannot perform better ei-
ther. Our results suggest that rigged economies might
be intrinsically uncomputable in certain limits.
Our work is designed in economic terms, but it has an
obvious political reading – e.g. construction and con-
trol of power structures. More pragmatically, in our
model wealth redistribution is achieved through low rig-
ging pressures. Empirical measurements of redistribution
might help us map real economies into our framework, as
has been done for similarly abstract models [22, 23]. At
large, the evolutionary stability of fair governance [13] is
under scrutiny. In ecosystems that bring together wealth,
people, and economic games, all subjected to Darwinism:
What lasting structures emerge? Do fair rules survive?
Under which circumstances does unfairness prevail?
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Appendix A: Payoff matrices for simple cases
Let us note that the model is actually grounded on
game theory by building payoff matrices for simple sce-
narios.
Take one game (n = 1) and a fixed population of
one player N(t) = 1 (i.e. even if the agent accumu-
lates wealth, she does not have descendants, so she never
pays CC ; she is not removed either if she accumulates
negative wealth). Supporting Table I shows the average
payoff that a player earns if she plays the same game re-
peatedly with fixed behavior (i.e. fixed strategy a11 and
rigging choice r11). If there is no intervention (r
1
1 = 0),
the winning rule R(t) is set randomly at each iteration
and the expected payoff per round is b/2. If the agent at-
tempts to rig the game (r11 = 1), she always succeeds (be-
cause there is no opposition) and sets R(t) equals to its
own strategy (R(t) = a1). Thus she ensures earning an
average b per round, from which CR must be subtracted.
The optimal strategy is to intervene if CR < b/2.
Things become more interesting if we add another
agent (N(t) = 2) while, again, playing only one game.
This case was discussed in the main text. Let us take a
closer look. There are three scenarios worth considering
separately, and each corresponds to a 2× 2 block matrix
from Table I:
• No player attempts any rigging (upper-left
block matrix in Table I). In this case the winning
rule is set randomly, so that both players win half
of the time. If they play the same strategy, when-
ever they win (i.e. half of the rounds), they must
split the earnings. If they play different strategies,
each agent still wins half of the time but they al-
ways get to keep all the earnings. In other words,
in this case the model reduces to a minority game.
If the winning rule behaves randomly because there
is no intervention, the preferable strategy is to stay
in the minority. This is true also when there are
more players (see below), since the only varying
factor that reduces a player’s earnings is the num-
ber of others with a same strategy, among whom
the benefit is split.
• Only one of the players attempts to rig the
game (either off-diagonal block matrices in Table
I). The intervening agent pays CR to ensure that
the winning strategy R(t) always matches her own.
Assuming that only one agent (e.g. agent 1, thus
look at the top-right block matrix in Table I) is
given the option to rig the game, doing it becomes
always favorable if CR < b/4, disregarding of what
action agent 2 takes. If b/4 < CR < b/2, then
rigging the game is favorable only if agent 2 plays
a different strategy. If CR > b/2, it never becomes
favorable to rig the game.
• Both agents attempt to rig the game (bottom-
right block matrix in Table I). Both agents pay CR
2Player’s behavior a = 0, r = 0 a = 1, r = 0 a = 0, r = 1 a = 1, r = 1
Payoff b/2 b/2 b− CR b− CR
TABLE I Payoff matrix for one game with one player. The agent’s behavior is coded by two bits. A first one (a)
indicates the agent’s strategy (0 or 1). A second bit (r) indicates whether the agent attempts to rig the game or not.
in this case. But they only intervene the game suc-
cessfully if both play the same strategy. Note that
this has the effect of turning the minority game
into a neutral one regarding the agent’s strategies
ai1: If both players are attempting to intervene the
game, they will always receive the same payoff dis-
regarding of whether a11 = a
2
1 or not. The received
payoff is always less than the best scenario with no
intervention. But, if CR < b/4, it is better than
the scenarios with no intervention and matching
strategies.
It becomes cumbersome to write payoff matrices when
more players are involved, but it is still feasible for
N(t) = 3. We do so in Supporting Tables II, III, and
IV. In them, we group up the behaviors of players 2 and
3, assuming that, whenever one of the three agents plays
a different strategy (i.e. not all ai1 are the same), it is
always player 1 (either a11 = 0 and a
2,3
1 = 1 or a
1
1 = 1
and a2,31 = 0). We call player 1 the minority player and
players 2 and 3 the majority players.
Supporting Table II shows the average payoff matrix
when only the minority player is allowed to rig the game.
If she is not meddling with the rules (left half of Support-
ing Table II) we deal again with a minority game. The
Nash equilibria of this subgame (ri1 = 0∀i and a11 6= a2,31 )
are Nash equilibria of the whole game if CR > b/4. For
cheaper cost of rigging, the global Nash equilibria disap-
pear as it becomes favorable to one of the majority agents
to intervene (for which we have to look at Supporting
Table III). This sets on a dynamic situation similar to
the one discussed in the main text. Finally, Supporting
Table IV has both majority players attempting (and suc-
ceeding, since they are in the majority) to rig the game.
Interestingly, if all three agents are trying to manipulate
the winning rule (red frame), the model turns into a ma-
jority game in which all three players earn b/3−CR. If an
agent decided to change its strategy ai1, this would put
her in the minority, in which (according to Supporting
Table IV), it would earn 0 per round – thus full coor-
dination is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame in which
everybody intervenes. This, however, is not a Nash equi-
librium of the complete game: in full coordination, it
would pay off to a single agent to stop rigging the game.
This suggests that the way that our model reaches large
levels of coordination (as discussed in the main text) is a
tragedy-of-the-commons scenario.
In a static situation (i.e. population is fixed and agents
always choose the same actions and whether to rig each
game or not), games are independent of each other. We
could take these payoff matrices and compute averages
over many games. The situation becomes more difficult
when dynamics are included. Because new agents can be
born and older ones may die, averages over time should
keep into account that agent’s actions feed back on each
other. For example, a possible good strategy for agent 1
may be to rig games that favor a third agent (say, agent
3) who, in turn, is rigging games that favor agent 1. In
such a way, games can become coupled to each other and
result in much more complicated payoff functions.
Appendix B: Supporting plots and discussion for increasing
economy size and fixed complexity
Despite its simplicity, the model turned out to have
very rich dynamics. Its behavior changes, sometimes
drastically, with the economy complexity (as measured
by the number of games, n) or with its size (as mea-
sured by wealth distributed at each round, B). In this
appendix we take a closer look to what happens when
the number of games is fixed, but the wealth distributed
in each game grows. We saw an example of this (with
n = 2) in the main text, and we saw that increasing the
number of resources drives agents to coordinate with each
other in different manners around the available strategies
and whether to rig them or not.
Let us start with the simplest case now, with n = 1.
We plot average population size in the steady state (Sup-
porting Figure 1a), rigging pressure over the only game
(Supporting figure 1b), and the strategy entropy (Sup-
porting Figure 1c) as more resources become available.
Circles over these plots show values of B for which we
show 1000 iterations of the dynamics in Supporting Fig-
ure 13.
As we saw for n = 2 in the main text, if there are very
few resources, spending them in intervening the economy
is not a favored behavior in the steady state. This implies
that the winning strategy is randomly 0 or 1, likely chang-
ing from one iteration to the next. As a consequence, the
steady population does not settle for either strategy. The
second row of Supporting Figure 13a shows fk the frac-
tion of agents playing 1 over time in game k = 1. We
see that this number moves around 0.5, indicating that
roughly half the population is choosing 1 and the other
half is choosing 0. This results in a high strategy entropy
〈hak〉 in game k = 1, as shown in the third row of Sup-
porting Figure 13a. The fourth row shows that, indeed,
the rigging pressure is negligible for low values of B.
Above some amount of available resources, an effective
level of rigging pressure starts to build up periodically
(lower row of Supporting Figure 13b-c). Conceive a situ-
3Agent 1
Agent 2, 3
TABLE II Payoff matrix of one game with three players – only the minority player can rig. We assume that
player 1 is in the minority when there is no consensus. In this table, only player 1 is allowed to rig the game, so she always
succeeds. Entries marked in gray are global Nash equilibria when rigging is very expensive CR >> b.
Agent 1Agent 2
Agent 1Agent 3
TABLE III Payoff matrix of one game with three players – only one of the majority players (player 2) rigs.
This is the only situation in which the symmetry between the majority players is broken.
ation in which no rigging exists, but a mutation produces
a single agent that decides to rig the game. She secures
the next rounds played, and all agents playing her same
strategy are consequently benefited. She will replicate,
producing more agents that rig the game in the same
direction. But those parasitic agents playing her same
strategy without paying CR will earn more and produce
a slightly larger descent. Darwinian dynamics expand
slight differences exponentially over time, thus eventu-
ally the rigging agents are driven off to extinction. Some
agents playing the other option might have survived –
perhaps because they had some savings. After all rigging
agents were removed from the population, those playing
the minority option will earn more money (as our analy-
sis of payoff matrices indicates), and start making a come
back. Eventually, a mutation in their descendants might
produce an agent rigging the game to favor the minor-
ity. This would start a cycle all over again. Supporting
Figure 13b-c shows that this oscillating behavior takes
place for a range of economy sizes B.
Vertical, dashed blue lines in this figure show the point
at which population reaches a maximum, which happens
as the rigging pressure peaks as well. Interestingly, this is
also the point at which the proportion of agents playing
either strategy is well balanced. The population min-
imum (indicated by vertical, dashed red lines) happens
when the rigging pressure is minimal as well and the pop-
ulation presents a more homogeneous strategy. Increas-
ing the economy size results in longer alternating cycles
of this nature. Perhaps, hoarding more resources might
make it more difficult to remove agents rigging the games
in one direction over the other.
Eventually, these cycles become infinitely long so
that most of the population ends up adopting a same
strategy (Supporting Figure 13d). This homogeneous
state supports a larger population than the cycling or
fully random regimes. However, convergence to the
majority is not full. A reservoir of agents playing the
minority strategy survives, suggesting that these can
occasionally succeed in rigging the game and upset the
majority.
Regarding n = 2, in Supporting Figure 2 we reproduce
the first three panels of Figure 2. Here we have added
error bars (which indicate the standard deviation of each
quantity over the last 500 iterations of each simulation)
to give an idea of the variation that we can find. Er-
ror bars are of similar relative magnitude in all examples
shown (Supporting Figure 1 for n = 1 and Supporting
Figure 3 for n = 3, as well as Supporting Figures 4 and
5 which compare several n). Hence, we omitted error
bars anywhere else for clarity. Figure 2 and Support-
ing Figure 2 both show a transition (similar to the one
observed for n = 1) from unintervened games (sample
dynamics are shown in Supporting Figure 14a), through
cycles of growing and declining coordination (Supporting
figure 14b-c), to more homogeneous states (Supporting
Figure 14d-g).
In the main text we indicated that this cyclic regime
(which we called a shift towards within-game coordina-
tion) is transited simultaneously for both games. There
are some nuances, though. Supporting Figures 14b-c
4Agent 1
Agent 2
TABLE IV Payoff matrix of one game with three players – both majority players rig the game. Since they are in
the majority, they always succeed in their attempt to set the winning rule. If all three players rig the game simultaneously (red
frame), the model turns into a majority game – i.e. the best strategy is to play what everybody else is playing. Gray squares
indicate Nash equilibria of this sub-game.
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SUP. FIG. 1 Fixed economy complexity, n = 1, and growing distributed wealth, B. a Average population size in the
steady state. b Rigging pressure over the only game in the steady state. c Strategy entropy in the only game in the steady
state. Circles over the plots curves indicate values of B for which we show samples of the dynamics in Supporting Figure 13.
show that for both cases the amount of rigging in both
games is very similar (bottom row). But 〈hak〉 reveals im-
portant asymmetries which, furthermore, change as we
increase B. For the lowest B value shown with cyclic
behavior (B = 500, Supporting Figures 14b), in aver-
age, the population does not converge on persistent ho-
mogeneous strategies for neither of the games. But it
does not stay divided randomly either (as it happens for
B = 300, Supporting Figure 14a). In the second example
with oscillating behavior (B = 700, Supporting Figure
14c), in average, the population has converged regarding
the strategy of one of the games. The dynamics move to-
wards converge for the other game as well, but they fail
periodically or, if they succeed, then the strategy for the
other game (formerly homogeneous) breaks apart. Sum-
ming up: while the level of intervention is similar in both
games, this symmetry is broken regarding how homoge-
neous the population is about each strategy.
After the cyclic behavior, Figure 2 and Supporting
Figure 2 still show two more regimes separated each by
a large boost in stable population size. As noted in the
main text, this last regime shift is not accompanied by
large changes in action entropy, 〈hak〉, of neither game.
Hence, we conclude that within-game coordination has
been exhausted and that new kinds of correlations, now
across games, are taking place. Supporting Figure 14d-g
are samples of the dynamics in those two regimes after
the cyclic behavior. Panels 14d-e sample the regime
between B ∼ 800 and 1600, and panels 14f-g sample
the regime for B > 1700. The second row shows that in
all four cases the strategies have become homogeneous
across the population for both games – still with
reservoirs of agents playing a minority strategy. The
level of homogeneity remains roughly the same for both
regimes – indicated by 〈hak〉 as well, which remains low
throughout. We appreciate the population boost already
discussed in the main text (average population in the
top panels of Supporting Figure 14d-e is lower than in
Supporting Figure 14f-g). We also appreciate that the
fluctuations in population is larger when the population
is smaller. The other significant difference between these
two last regimes is that the rigging pressure becomes no-
tably higher in the regime with larger B. This suggests
that the difference between both regimes lies in a more
efficient coordination between the rigging efforts across
games, allowing the population to extract more wealth
in average. For example, we see that both games sustain
a minority of agents playing the minority option even if
the population has broadly converged about each game’s
strategy. But these minority-playing agents might not
be the same in both games if the conditions allow it. A
transition to a higher across-game coordination might
happen if the agents playing the minority in both games
become the same.
Finally, for n = 3 too, we show average population
size in the steady state (Supporting Figure 3a), rigging
pressure over each game (Supporting Figure 3b), and ac-
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SUP. FIG. 2 Fixed economy complexity, n = 2, and growing distributed wealth, B. Average population size in the
steady state. b Average rigging pressure per game. c Average strategy entropy over the two games. Circles over the plots
curves indicate values of B for which we show samples of the dynamics in Supporting Figure 14. Error bars indicate the
standard deviation over the last 500 iterations of the corresponding simulation.
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SUP. FIG. 3 Fixed economy complexity, n = 3, and growing distributed wealth, B. Average population size in the
steady state. b Average rigging pressure per game. c Average strategy entropy over the three games. Circles over the plots
curves indicate values of B for which we show samples of the dynamics in Supporting Figure 15.
tion entropy (Supporting Figure 3c) as more resources
become available (i.e. as B grows). We observe more
regime shifts (as identified by boosts in population size)
than for n = 2, which is compatible with more available
games and more possibilities for across-game coordina-
tion.
Supporting Figure 15 shows samples of the dynamics
for various of these regimes, including the oscillatory
regime. We see again that the rigging pressure over
all three games is simultaneous, even if the symmetry
regarding strategy coordination is broken. In the exam-
ple shown we see that, in average, the population has
converged regarding the strategies of two out of three
games. As for n = 2, when the population converges
also about the third game, one of the former agreements
breaks apart. There are also values of B for which
there is convergence of, at most, one game in average
(not shown). Again, the extra regime shifts (which
we identify by abrupt boosts of 〈N〉) happen after
within-game coordination has been exhausted. This is
consistent with the idea that more games bring in more
possible across-game coordination, which are explored
only for large values of B.
As briefly discussed in the main text, adding more
games has two different effects: One the one hand more
regimes seem to become available (as duly noted); and
on the other hand, more consecutive regimes seem to be
visited within a smaller range of B. This means that, as
we increase B, regimes progress more rapidly into each-
other (Supporting Figure 4). This effect is exaggerated if
even more games are available (Supporting Figure 5). So
much so that, instead of regime shifts, we approximate
a continuous progression. The increase in rigging pres-
sure per game becomes parsimonious as well (while for a
small number of games it presented some discrete boosts
associated to regime shifts).
Supporting Figure 4c shows that exhausting the
within-game coordination results in a drop of strategy
entropy, 〈ha〉. We see that this drop becomes less ac-
centuated for larger n (Supporting Figure 5c). This sug-
gests that the onset of interactions across games some-
how thwarts within game coordination. In other words, a
more complex economy seems to enable populations with
more diverse strategies within single games.
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different n and B, reach similar stable population size. This suggests that some scenarios might be essentially equivalent. b
Average rigging pressure per game. c Average strategy entropy over the n games in each case.
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Appendix C: Robustness of results against variations of
model parameters
The maps that we develop allow us to chart our model
easily. Similarly to the maps built for 〈N〉 and σ(N)/ 〈N〉
in Figure 4 of the main text, it is possible to build maps
for other quantities such as the average strategy entropy,
〈ha〉 (Supporting Figure 6a); or the rigging pressure per
game, 〈r〉 /n (Supporting Figure 6b). Such maps can
help us reveal regimes and phenomenology in arbitrary
measurements but: How general are these phenomena?
Do they depend critically on model parameters?
The model has 6 parameters: One sets the wealth dis-
tributed by the economy in each round (b, B, and B0
are univocally linked in each case); another one sets the
available number of degrees of freedom and thus the econ-
omy’s complexity (i.e. the number of games, n); two pa-
rameters set up costs (of attempting to rig a game, CR;
and of producing descent, CC); a mutation rate pµ; and
the parameter Nmax that sets an external upper limit
to the population (this acts similarly to a load capac-
ity in ecological models). We designed our model with
the hope of pinning down essential features of rigged
economies. We hope that the elements involved in the
model introduce as few additional effects as possible. In
that sense, an abundance of parameters is not desired.
Furthermore, we hoped that the most interesting phe-
nomenology would depend on B and n. These parame-
ters capture respectively the economy’s size (as measured
by distributed wealth) and complexity, which are at the
center of our research questions. Luckily, as we show in
this appendix, the observed phenomenology is not much
altered when toying with the remaining parameters. This
suggests that the regimes and phenomenology discovered
for varying economy size and complexity should be found
over again for a range of model options – which speaks
strongly in favor of the minimalism of our approach.
First we note that the cost of rigging a game CR sets
a scale with respect to the wealth allotted to each game
b = B/n. In our simulations we set CR = 1. If we
would try a different value of CR, we could normalize
b˜ ≡ b/CR, C˜C ≡ CC/CR, and C˜R ≡ CR/CR = 1 and
map the parameter choice back to a case that we have
already studied. Thus actually our model has only 5 free
parameters.
Supporting Figure 7 shows what happens to 〈N〉 and
σ(N)/ 〈N〉 as CC changes. Interestingly, the effect in
〈N〉 seems negligible for the values explored (Figure Sup-
porting Figure 7a-c). More notably, this parameter has
the effect of displacing the onset of the large-fluctuations
regime (Supporting Figure 7d-f). If CC is smaller, this
regime ensues for a lower economy complexity, n. The pa-
rameter CC tells us how cheap it is to have descendants.
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SUP. FIG. 6 Comprehensive maps of strategy entropy
and rigging pressure. a Average strategy entropy, 〈ha(t)〉,
shows a dent for small n and large B – a situation that
we compared to cartels in the main text. This coordination
regime falls apart swiftly as complexity grows a little bit. If we
move to very large n without increasing B, coordination starts
to build up again – yet very smoothly. b Rigging pressure per
game, 〈r(t)/n〉. Unsurprisingly, it grows with the amount of
wealth distributed. More interestingly, it also grows with the
number of degrees of freedom in the system.
When it is cheaper, it is easier to trigger large fluctu-
ations; probably because a large descent explores more
behaviors (both in rigging decisions and game strategies)
simultaneously, as well as it displaces a bigger propor-
tion of former agents. Both these actions result in major
disruptions of the winning rules. Thus, cheaper descent
more easily brings up a scenario in which agents are con-
tinuously deceiving each other into bankruptcy. If this is
correct, other parameters that promote behavior diver-
sity or population renewal among agents should have a
similar effect.
Supporting Figure 8 shows, indeed, that the mutation
rate pµ prompts this expected outcome too. As for CC ,
〈N〉 is mostly unaffected by variations of pµ (not shown),
but increasing pµ has the predicted result of advancing
the onset of the large-fluctuations regime. In Supporting
Figure 8 we show a range of pµ with CC = 20. This choice
of CC is different from the value taken in simulations
in the main text (CC = 10) to show that, with a large
enough pµ, we can advance the onset of large fluctuations
to the point where it was with CC = 10 and pµ = 0.1.
Supporting Figure 9 shows the effect of CC on rigging
pressure and rigging pressure per game. The effect
is mostly uninteresting, as it just smooths or slightly
displaces a map similar to the settings commented in
the main text (Supporting Figure 6). The key outcome
is that rigging pressure grows both if more resources,
B, and more games, n, are available – as discussed in
the main text. A similar structure is found for different
values of pµ (not shown). The strategy entropy (not
shown) is largely unchanged by CC and pF – while large
enough pF (i.e. very large noise) has the expected effect
of weakening the convergence to a majority strategy for
low n and large B (arrows in Supporting Figure 6a).
The model is a bit more sensitive to the parameter
Nmax that sets an external maximum size to the pop-
ulation. This parameter makes sense as population size
might be constrained by actual physical limits – e.g., the
amount of people that can occupy a territory. It could
also be seen as a manufactured (‘rigged’) limit to the size
of the market. This is an important kind of economic ma-
nipulation not studied in the model. Even if we were to
look at Nmax from this perspective, model agents cannot
modify it, so we would not be studying such manipula-
tion organically, as we do with other degrees of freedom.
A more technical reason to set a parameter Nmax is
that it solves parsimoniously the problem of a maximum
average lifespan. In the limit Nmax →∞, the first agent
(who does not rig any game, hence does not pay CR)
never dies because it never ends up with negative wealth.
The same would happen to any descent that does not rig
any games. This is unrealistic and undesired. In the
current model, agents that last too long are naturally
and randomly replaced by newborns thanks to the finite
Nmax. If we would set an infinite Nmax, we would need
to introduce other mechanisms to remove unrealistically
long-lasting agents – e.g. an average life-time or remov-
ing agents with a wealth below a threshold w− > 0. It
would be interesting to try these and other variations in
the future – noting that they introduce new parameters
nevertheless.
Ideally, we would like to find intrinsic limits to popu-
lation size that emerge out of the model dynamics alone.
To achieve this, we would need to simulate the model
in the large Nmax limit. The value chosen to report
our results (Nmax = 1000) is a compromise between a
fairly large maximum population size and an ability to
run simulations within a reasonable time. We ran one
additional simulation for Nmax = 5000 and another one
for Nmax = 10000 (reported next). Each of these took
more than ten days in a fairly powerful computer cluster.
Supporting Figure 10 shows 〈N〉 for Nmax =
100, 1000, 5000, 10000. Some additional structure seems
to emerge for intermediate values of n (around n ∼ 20)
and B (around B ∈ [1000, 2000]) for large Nmax. It
might be interesting to look at this, but it is not so rele-
vant for our discussion. We see that the region associated
to the large-fluctuations regime for large n, one of the
most salient features of the model, is not very much af-
fected by Nmax. Average population sizes in the steady
state in this regime (Figure 4a) as well as its fluctuations
(Figure 4b-c) fall well below the chosen Nmax = 1000.
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SUP. FIG. 7 Comprehensive maps of 〈N〉 and σ(N)/ 〈N〉 for varying replication cost, CC . Maps result from
simulating case I (i.e. BI = B0, bI = B0/n) for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed wealth, B0. Black curves
represent trajectories B = B(B0 = 50, n) for cases II, III, and IV (dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed respectively). Horizontal
red lines at the bottom of each map represent case I with B0 = 50. a-c shows 〈N〉 and d-f show σ(N)/ 〈N〉. a, d, CC = 5; b,
e, CC = 10; c, f, CC = 20.
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SUP. FIG. 8 Comprehensive maps of σ(N)/ 〈N〉 for varying mutation, pµ. Maps result from simulating case I (i.e.
BI = B0, bI = B0/n) for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed wealth, B0. Black curves represent trajectories
B = B(B0 = 50, n) for cases II, III, and IV (dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed respectively). Horizontal red lines at the bottom
of each map represent case I with B0 = 50. a, pµ = 0.05; b, pµ = 0.10; c, pµ = 0.15; d, pµ = 0.20; e, pµ = 0.25; f, pµ = 0.30.
All this suggests that the reported 〈N〉 are intrinsic limits
emerging from the model.
The onset of the large-fluctuations regime, however, is
more affected (Supporting Figure 11). Increasing Nmax
results in a displaced onset of this regime. It happens for
notably larger values of n and B for increasing Nmax.
Within the plotted range, however, we still appreciate
fluctuations as large as 25% of population size for some
(n,B) combinations. Note that for Nmax = 10000 the
maximum population size is around two orders of magni-
tude bigger than the stable population size (∼ 100 for
the affected area). This strongly suggests that large-
fluctuations are an intrinsic regime of the model, even
if its precise location in the map is affected by Nmax.
Nevertheless, it is affected by Nmax, which indicates
that this phenomenon is enhanced by having a finite,
maximum population size. Let us compare the shift of
this onset with Nmax to the shifts observed when we var-
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SUP. FIG. 9 Comprehensive maps of rigging pressure per game for varying replication cost, CC . Maps result
from simulating case I (i.e. BI = B0, bI = B0/n) for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed wealth, B0. Black
curves represent trajectories B = B(B0 = 50, n) for cases II, III, and IV (dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed respectively).
Horizontal red lines at the bottom of each map represent case I with B0 = 50. a, CC = 5; b, CC = 10; c, CC = 20.
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SUP. FIG. 10 Comprehensive maps of 〈N〉 for varying maximum population size, Nmax. Maps result from simulating
case I (i.e. BI = B0, bI = B0/n) for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed wealth, B0. Black curves represent
trajectories B = B(B0 = 50, n) for cases II, III, and IV (dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed respectively). Horizontal red lines at
the bottom of each map represent case I with B0 = 50. a, N
max = 100; b, Nmax = 1000; c, Nmax = 5000; d, Nmax = 10000.
ied CC (Supporting Figure 7) and pµ (Supporting Figure
8). About these, we argued that the onset of the regime
was advanced by mechanisms that result in more diverse
strategies competing closer together or a higher popula-
tion turnover. Thus, lower CC (cheaper reproduction)
and higher pµ (increased mutation) both advanced the
onset of the regime because an array of diverse strate-
gies is promptly forced to compete, potentially altering
the winning rules in an unpredicted fashion. A larger
Nmax has the effect of diluting this competence because
there is less replacement of older agents. Accordingly,
higher Nmax displaces the large-fluctuations regime to
larger values of n and B. Oppositely, note that the pop-
ulation renewal introduced by smaller Nmax results in
a higher uncertainty about winning strategies. This is
consistent, as discussed in the main text, with an onset
of large fluctuations associated to a cognitive transition
of the population as a whole: at some point, it becomes
cognitively impossible to keep track of winning strategies
as agents attempt to deceive each other.
Another sensible area of the map is that with large B
and small n, which showed the transition to within-game
coordination that results in most of the population
converging to a same strategy for each game. Sup-
porting Figure 10 shows that for such combination of
parameters (large B and small n), there are enough
resources to sustain a very large average population size,
often saturating even for large Nmax values. Supporting
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SUP. FIG. 11 Comprehensive maps of σ(N)/ 〈N〉 for varying maximum population size, Nmax. Maps result from
simulating case I (i.e. BI = B0, bI = B0/n) for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed wealth, B0. Black curves
represent trajectories B = B(B0 = 50, n) for cases II, III, and IV (dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed respectively). Horizontal
red lines at the bottom of each map represent case I with B0 = 50. a, N
max = 100; b, Nmax = 1000; c, Nmax = 5000; d,
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SUP. FIG. 12 Comprehensive maps of strategy entropy, 〈ha〉 for varying maximum population size, Nmax. Maps
result from simulating case I (i.e. BI = B0, bI = B0/n) for ranges of economic complexity, n, and distributed wealth, B0.
Black curves represent trajectories B = B(B0 = 50, n) for cases II, III, and IV (dashed, dotted, and dot-dashed respectively).
Horizontal red lines at the bottom of each map represent case I with B0 = 50. a, N
max = 100; b, Nmax = 1000; c,
Nmax = 5000; d, Nmax = 10000.
Figure 12 shows that this homogeneous regime remains
present as we increase Nmax. Some isolated cases in
Nmax = 10000 (Supporting Figure 12d) and, more
notably, Nmax = 5000 (Supporting Figure 12c) show up.
These cases appear in the plots as outstanding pixels
of huge 〈ha〉 in their otherwise smoother neighborhood
with lower entropy (further supporting that these are
oddballs).
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All in all, the results summarized in this appendix
strongly suggest that the relevant phenomenology of the
model is the one reported in the main text, and that this
phenomenology is robust against reasonable variations of
all parameters. Furthermore, changes on the onset of this
phenomenology as we vary these extra parameters are
parsimonious and follow logical explanations. All this,
once again, is a strong reassurance of the minimalism of
the model. This phenomenology likely underlies more
complicated models that could study additional effects
such as those discussed in the final section of the pa-
per. We would expect to find at least similar regimes
and regime shifts to the ones described here, even if the
exact numerical values at which they happen are altered.
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